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Tms is a report on the labor market for female clerical employees of
banks and insurance companies in Boston. The research is part of the
broad effort to appraise the operation of labor markets in the United
States so that their strengths and limitations as wage-determining and
labor-allocating devices are better understood, and so that policy sug-
gestions can be based on a firm factual foundation.
More specifically, study of a white collar labor market serves these
purposes: (1) The field is important for its own sake, since this occupa-
tional group is large and growing, and there has been little previous
wage research in the white collar field.1 (2) The conditions that prevail
here offer important contrasts to those encountered in many recent
wage studies, which have concentrated on collective bargaining in
manufacturing industries. Orme Phelps, for example, has suggested the
importance of concentrating on differentiation if research is to be
relevant to the whole labor force rather than only to manufacturing or
to unionized situations.2 (3) Studies of nonunion labor markets can
contribute to efforts to isolate the effects of unions on wages. For the
most part, studies of the impact of unions have proceeded without
NoTE: The research reported here was conducted by the author in collaboration
with Irwin L. Flerrnstadt and Elbridge S. Puckett when all three were associated
with the Department of Economics and Industrial Relations Section, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology. The research was completed in 1956 and reported in
summary fashion at the Tenth Annual Meeting of the Industrial Relations Research
Association (September, 1957) in a paper entitled "Wage Determination in a
Non-Union Labor Market." The present paper draws freely on the earlier one,
while reporting the research results in greater detail. Carol Femstrom provided
editorial assistance and help in preparation of the tables and Douglass V. Brown
valuable comments on the manuscript.
The research received financial support from the Sloan Research Fund of the
School of Industrial Management and from the Industrial Relations Section, Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology.
I thank my colleagues for their help on the research and Massachusetts Institute
of Technology for financial support of the project.
Subsequent to the date of the Conference on Labor Economics, a study of the
clerical labor market in Madison, Wisconsin, became available. The findings of
this more recent study are strikingly similar to those reported here. See Eaton Hall
Conant, "Wages and the Behavior of Firms and Workers in a Clerical Labor
Market," University of Wisconsin, Ph.D. Dissertation, 1960.
2OrmePhelps, "A Structural Model of the United States Labor Market," Indus-
trial and Labor Relationr Review,April1957, pp. 402-423.
107A NONUNION MARKET
the benefit of extensive information about nonunion labor markets in
the United States today. (4) Nonunion labor markets predominate in
the United States, and it is important to understand how they work as a
basis for decisions on a wide range of economic issues. As an example,
much of the discussion of the wage-push inflation question assumes
that wage changes are transmitted almost automatically from one sector
of the economy to another, from the union to the nonunion sector,
without reference to particular labor market conditions. Knowledge
about the mechanisms of a market such as the one under review can
test this assumption.
The pages that follow present a description of the research approach,
methods, and sources of data; information about employment and
wages in the field during the period studied; an analysis of the reaction
of the firms studied to their labor market; information on the char-
acteristics and market behavior of their employees; a view of the
role of various market intermediaries in this situation; and general
conclusions.
Research Methods and Sources of Data
The limited research resources available for this study were spread over
both the demand and supply sides of this labor market in order to
obtain a comprehensive view and draw together two areas of theory
and research that are too often treated separately: wage studies focus-
ing on demand conditions and collective bargaining on the one hand,
and, on the other, labor force and labor mobility analysis.
Concentration on one type of industry makes it possible both to trace
a broadly identifiable set of demand conditions through the wage
policies and actions of a related group of firms and to get an under-
standing of the labor market behavior of employees in the industry
and of the labor supply conditions facing the finns. Limited research
resources and a desire for fairly comprehensive information led to con-
centration on the banking and insurance industry groups and on female
clerical workers as areas for research.
The data in Table 1 show both the strength and weakness of this
selection. The banking and insurance industries are quantitatively
significant in the Boston area and clerical employment dominates these
industries, but other industries employ even larger numbers of clerical
workers. The sample of employees interviewed as part of the research





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































therefore may not represent the supply side of the whole market for
clerical workers in Boston. We are dealing here, then, with a submarket,
a part of the general market for clerical employees.
Basic descriptive and statistical information about the Boston area
and about banking and insurance is available from state and federal
government sources and from various private financial services. These
data provided the general background for our more detailed research.
The detailed study is based for the most part on information supplied
by 13 banks and insurance companies in the area and by 158 of their
employees. Most of the data were collected in 1954, 1955, and 1956,
though some use is made of information referring to later years. Each
of these firms supplied a list of its female, nonsupervisory employees,
from which 15 in the case of large firms and 10 in the case of small
firms were drawn at random. Tables 2 and 3 provide data on the size
of firms in the study compared with all banking and insurance estab-
lishments in the area.
Each firm was asked for a wide range of factual information about
its operations, particularly with respect to wage and employment mat-
ters. While the information obtained from the firms varied considerably
in both quality and quantity, it was sufficient in every case to be useful
and, in some cases, was voluminous and most helpful. On the basis
of this information interviews were held with individuals in each firm
in an effort to obtain judgments on policy questions and interpretations
of the data collected from their firm.
Each employee was interviewed privately by a member of the re-
search group and was assured that the responses were confidential.
Most interviews took place at the respondent's home, but some were
conducted at other convenient places such as an office in the Massa-
The 13 firms were selected to assure that each would have a significant number
of female clerical employees and that the unit studied would be responsible for
its own policies. This led to elimination of all finns with fewer than 100 employees
in all and those with home offices outside the area. The total possible number of
firms was thus reduced from some 674 (including 417 offices of insurance agents)
to 27, accounting for 54 per cent of the employment. These 27 firms were then
separated by size (more and less than 750 employees) and by industry (banking,
life insurance, and insurance other than life). Two large firms and 3 small ones
were then selected from each industry, though 2 of the smaller finns were later
dropped from the study. In one case, the firm decided to shift its operations to a
suburban location just as the study was getting under way and preferred not to
be involved simultaneously in a move and a study of employment problems. In
the other case, the firm decided not to be involved in the study, apparently because
of reluctance to permit interviews with a random sample of its employees. Where
there was any choice in selecting firms, it was made at random.
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chusetts Institute of Technology or a downtown coffee shop. The com-
pany cafeteria of one firm was used, and the quality of the interviews
obtained there indicated that the results were not biased because of
the location. Each employee was asked for considerable demographic
and household information and for a fairly detailed work history. The
TABLE 2
TOTAL BANKING AND INSURANCE ESTABLISHMENTS IN BOSTON AND
BROOKLINE (A) COMPARED WITH FIRMS HAVING HOME OFFICES IN
BOSTON OR BROOKLINE AND EMPLOYING MORE THAN 100 PEOPLE (B),
SEPTEMBER 1953
Establishments in A Firms in B
Employees
Number Number in B as
Number of Number of Per Cent of
industry of UnitsEmployeesof UnitsEmployeesTotal in B
Banking 90 9,739 14 8,354 86%
Insurance 584 27,998 13 12,211 44
Life 47 10,932 5 6,921 63
Other than life120 11,981 8 5,290 44
Agents 417 5,085 0 — —
Total 674 37,737 27 20,565 54%a
a Excludingagents, this is 63 per cent.
interviews were conducted informally, with interviewees encouraged
to talk freely, but in areas relevant to the study.
Information was also obtained from interviews with representatives
of private employment agencies, private clerical schools, public and
parochial high schools, and from the Massachusetts Employment
Service. These interviews focused on the scope of the placement activi-
ties of these organizations and the ways in which the counsellors
worked with employers and those seeking work.
General Information About the Area and industry
The period 1948-56 was one of generally full employment for clerical
workers in the Boston area, as in most other areas of the United States,
though the situation in Boston eased perceptibly in 1949 and 1954.
Reports on job openings listed by the State Employment Service (SE S),
voluminous newspaper advertisements for clerical help, the testimony
of employment managers, high school guidance counsellors and other































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6FOR WHiTE COLLAR LABOR
course graduates seeking work each year all confirmthis general char-
acterization of employment conditions. More particularly, this was a
period of rising employment in the finance sector of the Boston economy,
reflecting the dominant theme of growth in demand for their services
experienced by the great majority of firms, including 11 of the 13
covered in this study.
Estimates made by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics show that
employment in finance rose by about 12 per cent between 1951 and
1956. In contrast, the rate of increase in nonfarm employment in the
Boston area was about 4 per cent and in manufacturing employment
was about the same in 1956 as it had been in 1951. Moreover, personnel
turnover among clerical workers is high, as the young girls who make
up the bulk of employees move into and out of the labor force as well as
among jobs. Even a firm with stable clerical employment, on the
average, will constantly need to attract new employees.
Data compiled by the BLS indicate that clerical rates of pay in the
Boston area rose by about 55 per cent between 1948 and 1956, a gain
larger than for production workers in the manufacturing industries of
Massachusetts and of Boston.5 The year-by-year increases in clerical
rates are shown in Table 4. Note that the rate of increase was smaller
between 1949-50 and 1954-55 than for other yearly intervals.
The wage structure for office occupations in banks and insurance
companies is broadly the same throughout the country, as shown in
Table 5. In addition, as Chart 1 indicates, the structure of rates has
been stable in Boston from 1948 through 1958. These facts may be ac-
counted for in part by the broad similarity of the basic occupational
skills used by firms in office work. While a given job tends to have a
somewhat wider content in a small firm than in a large one, and the
employee in the small firm probably develops more job knowledge
4Emplo!,tment andEarnings,Bureau of Labor Statistics, Annual Supplement,
June 1957, p. 81.
5Averageweekly earnings of production workers in manufacturing in the Boston
area rose by about 21 per cent between 1951 and 1956 compared with a 82.4
per cent rise in the standard weekly salaries of women office workers in finance,
insurance, and real estate between the same years in the area. Over the entire
period, 1948 to 1956, average weekly earnings of manufacturing production workers
in Massachusetts rose by about 40 per cent. The rise for women office workers in
the Boston area for the same period was 54.6 per cent. Production worker per-
centages were computed from data appearing in Ibid, p. 127 and the May, 1954
issue, p. 110. The wage concept used is not strictly comparable with that for the
computations of changes in wages for women office workers. The differences in
magnitude of movement are great enough, however, to substantiate the general
statement made in the text.
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TABLE4
STANDARDWEEKLY SALARIES OF WOMEN OFFICE WORKERS IN THE FINANCE,
INSURANCE, AND REAL ESTATE DIVISION IN BOSTON,







































Per cent of 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1956
increase 5.0 3.8 6.9 5.9 5.0 4.9 2.8 10.6 54.6
NOTE: Salaries are based on the following selected jobs: Bookkeeping-
machine operators, class B; comptometer operators; file clerks, class A and class
B; order clerks; payroll clerks; key.punch operators; office girls; secretaries;
general stenographers; switchboard operators; switchboard operator-receptionists;
tabulating-machineoperators;generaltranscribing-machineoperators;and
typists, class A and class B. Since data were not collected for secretaries, key-
punch operators, and tabulating-machine operators in 1948, 1949, and 1950,
data for those years are based on the 12 other jobs. Data for comparable jobs
were used to make the link between 1950 and 1951.
a In computing the indexes and percentage increase, the average weekly
salaries for each of the selected occupations for each year were multiplied by
the average of March 1953 and March 1954 employment in the job. These
weighted earnings for individual occupations were then totaled to obtain an
aggregate for each year. Finally, the ratio of the aggregate for a given year to
the aggregate for the base period (March 1953) was computed and the result
multiplied by the base year index (100) to get the index for the given year.
There were changes in the minimum size of establishments covered between
January 1950 and March 1951 (26 to 21) and between April 1952 and March
1953 (21 to 51), and no adjustment was made in the data to make average
weekly earnings comparable for all periods. The use of constant employment
weights, however, eliminates the effect of changes in the proportion of workers
represented in each job included in the data.
that is strictly organizational in nature, the basic skills involved are
easily identifiable, commonly used, and transferable from one firm to
another. This does not mean, however, that individual performance on
a given job is uniform; indeed, substantial quality differences appear
to characterize work on these jobs.
This uniformity of job content helps to explain the clustering of rates
of pay for particular jobs. For example, 80 per cent of the establish-
ments employing inexperienced typists in Boston in the winter of 1957-
58 and having a specified minimum hiring rate fell within a 30 per
cent rate range; 60 per cent of the establishments fell within a 123k












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Bk = Bookkeeping machine operator, B
= Clerk, file B
SI = Stenographer, general
Sw = Switchboard operator, general
Se = Secretary
TA = Typist, A
TB = Typist, B
ACClerk, accounting, B
KO = Key-punch operalor
1954
dispersionin scheduled weekly hours. Table 6 shows that weekly hours
are shorter in finance than in most other industries. In finance, most
workers are on a 363- or 373k-hour week. These differences in hours of








































AC, K0, and Se
1948 1951 1958FOR WHITE COLLAR LABOR
TABLE 6
SCHEDULED WEEKLY HOURS OF OFFICE WORKERS IN BOSTON, BY INDUSTRY,
WINTER 1957-58






0 U R S
38¼Tota1L40Over 40
All Industries 8 10 25 8 66 34 1
Manufacturing 9 2 15 9 36 63 2
Public utilities 3 — 55 — 58 42 —
Wholesale trade— 8 31 4 51 49 —
Retail trade 12 7 19 6 78 22 —
Finance 9 22 28 11 94 6 —
Services 19 6 13 — 56 43 1
SOURCE: Wages and Related Benefits, BLS, Feb., 1959.
aIncludesweekly schedules other than those shown separately.
group, so that, on an hourly basis, finance would move up in the
community wage structure, and the width of the band of rates for
particular jobs would be narrowed (see Table 7). Nevertheless, the
weekly take-home pay in finance is relatively low.
TABLE 7
















class B 61.00 54.00 — 62.5052.0051.00 —
Accounting clerks,
class B 60.50 55.50 62.00 59.0051.5052.00 60.00
File clerks,
class B 50.50 46.0048.50 49.5044.5045.5048.50
Key-punch
operators 59.50 56.00 62.00 63.5053.0053.50 —
Secretaries 74.50 70.50 85.50 74.5069.5068.50 66.00
Stenographers,
general 64.00 59.50 64.50 67.5055.5057.00 55.50
Switchboard
operators 66.50 56.50 67.00 63.5055.0057.00 49.00
Typists, class A 57.00 60.00 — 72.00 — 57.00 61.50
Typists, class B 54.00 50.00 50.50 55.0049.0049.50 48.50
SOURCE: Wages and Related Benefits, BLS, Feb., 1959.
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Comparison among areas of weekly wages for women office workers
in finance shows that Boston ranks about tenth among thirteen cities
for which data are available (Table 8). However, weekly hours are
sharply lower in Boston than in most cities,6 so that on an hourly basis
Boston would move up to about the middle of the distribution.
UNIONIZATION
The employee groups involved in the study were not unionized in
1956, nor were there any serious attempts to unionize them in the post-
World War II decade on which this study concentrated. From time to
time, general statements about white-collar organizing drives were
issued from a federation headquarters or the office of a national union,
but nothing concrete took place in Boston banking and insurance
offices. By the winter of 1957-58, the only industry group in which a
high proportion of office workers was organized was public utilities
(switchboard operators are classified as office workers, and most tele-
phone company employees in Boston are members of independent
unions). For all industries, 15 to 19 per cent of office workers were
employed in establishments where their occupations were covered by
collective bargaining agreements.7 White-collar labor, then, may be
characterized as a nonunion labor market.
SERVICE-RENDERING INDUSTRIES
Banking and insurance firms are essentially service rendering rather
than goods producing in their functions. It is characteristic of these
firms that, while wage costs are small in relation to the total amount
of money handled, they are large in relation to the cost of the service
rendered. Firms use, as one measure of their own effectiveness, ratios
of labor cost to total costs and such ratios are often used by public
examiners. Thus, wage rates, as a central element in wage costs, are
of far more than passing importance to banks and insurance companies.
Operating policies tend to reflect the responsibility as trustees for
large amounts of the public's money, which is exercised by these firms.
6 U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Wages and Related Benefits, Nineteen Labor
Markets, 1957-58, BLS, Bulletin No. 1224-20 (issued Feb. 1959), P. 55.
The individual industry percentages were: manufacturing, 20-24; public utili-
ties, 75-79; wholesale trade, 15-19; retail trade, 10-14, and services, 0-9. The survey
did not have sufficient coverage to warrant separate presentation of data for finance,
insurance, and real estate, but information collected in the course of this study
suggests that finance falls in the 0-9 per cent group. The all-industry percentage







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































These organizations are touched throughout with the public interest,
and there is a long history of regulation by state and federal govern-
ments to remind management of its obligations. The impact on wage
policy of these public interest and regulatory aspects of banking and
insurance businesses may be indirect and somewhat elusive, but—
particularly for firms writing policies required by law, as workmen's
compensation or automobile liability insurance—the direction of pres-
sures is clear. The atmosphere within which many of the firms work
out their wage policies can be summed up: money held in trust must
be handled conservatively; increases in costs must be justified in terms
of public service rendered at the minimum possible cost.
Despite many broad similarities in their immediate environment and
operating problems, firms in this sector also vary in important respects.
Some are stock companies and others mutual companies; the public's
stake in the efficiency of their operations varies; some are quite small
in size and others are huge in the scale of their operations; the markets
they serve vary in rate of growth, number of competitors, and in other
ways. While all variations have implications for their operations in the
labor market, this is a market characterized on the demand side by
firms touched with the public interest and accustomed to moving
slowly and conservatively on matters affecting costs of operations.
The Firms and Their Wage and Employment Policies
William Bowen,8 at the beginning of his summary of the findings of
certain labor market studies, states, "...perhapsthe most dominant
theme of these studies...istheir emphasis on the diversity of ways
in which individual firms react to changes in the 'scarcity' of labor."
The elements of this diversity and how various courses of action
develop may be expressed in general terms before turning more
specifically to the findings of this study.
8WilliamG. Bowen, The Wage-Price Issue: A Theoretical Analysis (Princeton
University Press, 1960), pp. 94-95. His full discussion runs from pp. 93-103. The
labor-market studies on which he relies and from which I, too, have drawn are:
R. A. Lester, Hiring Practices and Labor Competition, Industrial Relations Section,
Princeton University, 1954; idem, Adjustments to Labor Shortages; Management
Practices and Institutional Controls in an Area of Expanding Employment, Industrial
Relations Section, Princeton University, 1955; Charles A. Myers and George P.
Shultz, The Dynamics of a Labor Market, New York, Prentice-Hall, 1951; and
Lloyd G. Reynolds, The Structure of Labor Markets; Wages and Labor Mobility
in Theory and Practice, New York, Harper, 1951.
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MODEL OF A FIRM'S RESPONSE TO CHANGES IN ITS
LABOR MABXET CONDITIONS
It may be useful to start with the growing consciousness of the firm
that it has problems on its hands as it faces a tightening labor market.
The firm's need for labor may be growing rapidly, as it was for many
of the firms included in this study. Even without growth in demand,
employment of a labor force characterized by high turnover means
that hiring is a constant activity. Let the labor market tighten and
problems appear for the firm, particularly at the hiring level. If the
firm is accustomed to paying low rates for the labor it hires and to a
market where jobs are scarcer than people, it is likely to view with
alarm the gradual rise in the rates it pays.
Growing consciousness of the problem leads to increased effort to
deal with it. A personnel department is formed with responsibilities
for policy as well as for routine employment. Information is sought
about rates paid by other firms and the methods they use to deal with
the problem. Many of these methods may substitute for, or at least
provide an important complement to, increases in wage rates—advertis-
ing, visits to high schools, more careful employment interviewing, and
other means. The tastes of present and prospective employees may be
cultivated by provision of special features in working conditions.
Quality standards may be changed, at least on certain jobs, and efforts
may be made to see how part-time help can be used or used more
effectively. These measures serve to enlarge the labor pool from which
the firm draws. It may be necessary also to reorganize jobs. To some
extent capital expenditures for laborsaving equipment may be substi-
tuted for labor where there is great and apparently lasting scarcity in
a particular occupation. The personnel department is the prime origina-
tor and administrator within the organization of this nonwage response.
The firm may also be forced to change its wages, especially as its
competitors' demands on the market increase. Strategies may vary, de-
pending in part upon employment needs and success with nonwage
appeals. The firm may decide to be a wage leader, hoping to attract
a high quality of applicants; conversely, it may plan on high turnover
and low quality as a result of lagging wages, in favor of hoped-for
lower costs.
In deciding on the relative weight to put on nonwage and wage
forms of adjustment, there are a number of factors to be borne in mind.
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As Bowen states,° "the basic economic appeal of these non-wage forms
of adjustment is that they may permit a rather subtle yet a profitable
form of wage discrimination." Thus, a wage increase at the hiring level
is visible and will have an impact on the balance of the wage structure.
Within limits, this is not true for many nonwage methods of adjustment.
In addition, the firm may consider the reversibility of its actions should
market conditions change. It is much easier to reduce buying effort
than to cut wages. The responses of a firm to variations in labor market
conditions, then, are likely to be quite diverse. Wages are an important
element of response but are far from the only one.
COMPANY PERSONNEL POLICIES
The emergence and development during the decade following World
War II of explicit personnel policies in the firms studied and of organi-
zational arrangements for administering them is one of the clear find-
ings of this study. The general tightness of the labor market, following
an era in the 1930's and early 1940's when the supply of labor was
generally ample and when the job security offered by banks and in-
surance companies gave them a preferred position in the labor market,
not only influenced wage levels and wage policies, but also precipitated
a complete re-evaluation of personnel policies. With the exception of
two of the smaller firms, one or more of the following changes were
evident in all the firms studied.
1. Advent and expansion of personnel departments. In several of the
smaller firms where the need for personnel departments had never been
felt, additional resources were allocated to the tasks of procuring and
maintaining an adequate labor force. In the case of one company, too
small to bear the cost alone, a personnel department was set up to
serve two companies which were related in a financial and geographic
sense. In all the companies, personnel problems were accorded more
attention at the policy-making level. In some cases, specific responsi-
bility devolved upon a man also engaged in other policy problems.
In other cases, especially in larger firms, a man of policy-making calibre
was given the status of a high company official and the full-time job
of organizing the personnel function in the firm.
2. New methods of recruiting labor. With the exception of one of the
larger firms, the pre-worid War II practice had been to rely on walk-in
applicants to fill the company's personnel needs. Reliance on walk-ins
Bower, TheWage-Price Issue, p. 96.
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and informal channels of recruitment now proved insufficient and was
supplemented by more active efforts to find workers and to impress
them with the merits of working for the particular company. The
larger firms developed active recruitment efforts for members of high-
school graduating classes and, in some cases, combined this recruiting
with opportunities for part-time work in the last part of the senior year.
Smaller firms increased sharply their use of employment agencies and,
to a somewhat lesser extent, their use of newspaper advertising.
3. Cooperation with other companies. The tradition had been to
regard wage and other personnel practices as confidential within the
firm and among firms. This policy of secrecy was scrapped, and all the
firms are now involved in efforts to develop a common pooi of informa-
tion about the labor market.
4. Expansion of the labor pool from which employees are drawn.
The larger firms, especially, formerly relied exclusively—and still rely
primarily—on high-school graduates as the source of labor. But hiring
standards have been relaxed in various ways. Firms that had employed
only single girls relaxed that policy (one personnel manager mentioned
that "we even hired a sailor's wife"). In five firms, conscious effort was
made to identify jobs suitable for handicapped persons and to find
people to fill these jobs, an effort described as having quite satisfactory
results. In at least three cases, jobs were set up for part-week and
part-day employment. In two cases, a so-called "following" of workers
has been developed to help meet seasonal needs for extra workers.
5. Increased cultivation of employee tastes. Although the physical
appearance of the offices of the firms studied seemed much more
pleasant in some cases than in others, all the firms emphasized their
working conditions in employment interviews, contrasting them with
the less "nice" working conditions and fellow employees in "trade"
and "factories." A company-financed dance at a prominent hotel may
help promote this notion. Other efforts include the maintenance of
subsidized cafeterias and the adjustment of working hours to ease the
burdens of traveling to and from work. Of course, where some special
condition exists, such as the existence of a new air-conditioned building,
that fact is called to the attention of prospective employees.
6. Efforts to deal more effectively with grievances. These efforts are
in part preventive. Ten of the firms have developed formal wage struc-
tures, in seven cases through use of job evaluation. Training programs
for supervisors have been designed to develop an appreciation of corn-
123A NONUNION MARKET
pany policies and of the employees' view of the organization. The be-
ginnings of formal grievance procedures were apparent in two or three
companies, but this development did not appear to have gone very far.
7. Substitution of capital for labor. Dictating machines and large
typing pools are widely used, although the consequent depersonalizing
of work relationships has caused problems in some instances. Only
the higher executives seem entitled now to the well-rounded secretary.
The period of this study preceded widespread installation of modern
electronic computers to perform clerical tasks in offices such as those
studied. These laborsaving devices have doubtless been welcomed in
part because they ease personnel requirements.
8. Changes in the quality of labor expected. There are two dimen-
sions to the "quality" problem. On the one hand, the tightness of the
labor market has an impact on hiring standards, as expressed in such
variables as intelligence, technical skill, and personal appearance. On
the other, discipline is affected, and expectations about individual per-
formance are altered. The discipline dimension of quality is especially
obvious to firms whose wages are on the low side of the market. In
one such case, the wage position of the firm was shifted in part to give
supervisors a stronger hand in insisting on good performance, including
low absenteeism and promptness.
These changes in personnel policies are related more or less directly
to the tightness of the labor market. Increased turnover, increased diffi-
culty in filling vacancies, and knowledge by the companies that their
employees could readily obtain jobs elsewhere were all factors under-
lying the changes. In response to these pressures, the firms invested in
a variety of nonwage appeals to new employees and in organizational
arrangements to implement these appeals. They approached the labor
market with increased sophistication and buying effort.
WAGE STRATEGIES
Increased buying effort did not relieve banks and insurance companies
of the necessity of increasing wage rates, for clerical rates in the Boston
area rose by about 55percent between 1948 and 1956. Except for
the two smallest firms in the sample studied, the primary emphasis in
company wage policy was on the hiring rate for inexperienced workers.
The great majority of accessions were at that level, reflecting policies of
promotion from within, the location of turnover, the concentration of
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employment on routine jobs, and the nature of the largest increment in
the labor pool—each year's high school graduates.
In general, the approach of firms to increases in hiring rates was
conservative. Within the firm the burden of proof fell largely on those
individuals who advocated an increase. The success of these companies
in preventing an explosive upward movement of hiring rates is sug-
gested by the fact that their rates were just above the minimum wage
at the time when the minimum was raised to 75centsand later to
$1.00 per hour. Indeed, three companies decided on rate increases in
anticipation of the minimum wage change, which thus performed a
sort of mopping-up function in this labor market. Nevertheless, as will
be developed below, the wage changes studied here were made pri-
marily in response to labor supply problems.
The focus of pressures about hiring rates was on individuals in the
personnel department. These were the people making contacts with
high schools and employment agencies. They interviewed applicants,
trying to attract them by the "net advantages" of working for the firm;
they received the complaints of operating departments about the poor
quality of labor hired and complaints from outside the firm about any
inadequacies of their hiring rates. For the most part, the personnel
department took the initiative in proposing changes in pay scales or in
arranging systems to make the initial rates to be offered more flexible.
They were forced to develop their case and argue it through a top
management that almost universally took a "show me" attitude. Even
if the personnel department did not make policy, it played a strategic
role in initiating, administering, and often suffering with policy.
Data on minimum hiring rates were collected for a period of nine
years, 1947-55. In six of the nine years at least 10 firms reported their
minimum hiring rates. At most, the top rate in a given year was 12
per cent higher than the bottom rate and, generally, the band was
under 10 per cent. In some cases, predominantly for firms in the low
end of the band, the minimum hiring rate was the bottom of a range
within which hiring could take place. The purpose was to give more
flexibility in bidding for labor, and the effect was to narrow the actual
band of rates. In part, the narrowness of the band reflects the fact
that the large firms included in this study were points of reference
in wage surveys for all the firms studied. In general, the larger the
firm, the broader the coverage of wage comparisons it made (Table 9).
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tended to follow market movements. Small and large firms seeking a
high quality of help generally made rate changes on an analytic basis.
They had established a desired position for themselves and, on the
basis of wage survey information, sought to maintain that position.
Firms with a low wage—low quality strategy, however, tended to de-
mand more than wage-survey evidence for a change in their rates, in
part because of distrust of the survey results. They looked for evidence
in their own experience with recruiting and turnover to supplement
the findings of wage surveys.
Most of the larger firms engaged in heavy recruiting efforts in the
spring, trying to hire "our share of this year's crop" of high school girls.
If a large firm missed out on this market, it would tend to have per-
sonnel difficulty for the balance of the year. As a result, the very struc-
ture of labor supply forced upon the firm an analytical problem. It
was necessary to anticipate in policy on hiring rates what the so-called
"going rate" would be. Firms could still pursue varying wage-quality
strategies, but even the firm with the low wage strategy apparently
could not afford to be very far off the pace. Interviews with recruiters
from such firms are full of references to adverse comments, made by
high school guidance counsellors, about their rates of pay.
Two general observations stand out most clearly from the interviews
with management people. The first is the conviction that significant
quality differences exist in this labor supply and that the average
quality hired will be related to the firm's place in the wage structure.
The wage-quality relationship seems to take shape over a period of
time. Firms with lagging wages may not at first notice much difference
in the number and quality of applicants, but they do notice a dif-
ference in their ability to hire these applicants. They could fill their
openings without raising the wage but only by lowering hiring stand-
ards. A firm that is contracting its employment could, therefore, lag
in wages for some time without feeling much effect. On the other hand,
an expanding firm with jobs opening up at higher skill levels must
attract a relatively high percentage of promotable girls. Finns in such
a position seem to find a high wage strategy of critical importance in
their ability to select the kind of work force they desire.
The other general observation concerns the power of labor supply
forces as these forces appeared to the firms. The changes in hiring rates
in all these firms were unquestionably responses to tight labor supply
conditions. As one personnel director put it, "We have to at least keep
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up with the salaries of the other banks and insurance companies. Every-
one is howling for girls and the kids are not dumbbells. They go where
they pay more." This is not to overlook the importance of nonwage
appeals. Rather, a hiring rate above a certain minimum seemed to be
a necessary, though not a sufficient, condition for successful recruit-
ment. In some cases firms established a "going-rate" policy that did not
wait on specific indicators of recruiting trouble. In other cases, the
firm's policy of waiting for adverse experience of its own before chang-
ing rates provided an almost steady stream of internal evidence that
low wages and labor supply troubles are related.
Another important aspect of wage policy involves the structure of
wages in the firm. The point has already been made that the firms
moved during the post-World War II decade toward more formal wage
structures and, in about half the cases, to a job evaluation system of
some sort (Table 9). The reasons for this development did not seem
to differ much from those found elsewhere: the inequities and chaos
that can develop within firms from a random and uncontrolled rate
structure; the procedural difficulties of making rate comparisons with-
out some sort of plan; the stimulation of War Labor Board and Wage
Stabilization Board regulations; and the general tendency to imitate
what is being done elsewhere. Underlying these general reasons in the
firms studied, two others appeared to be important. Emphasis on hiring
rates led to a tendency for compression in the wage structure unless
this problem was dealt with explicitly. Compression, as experienced
by a number of the firms, was deplored because faithful employees
with limited mobility were apparently being neglected with a generally
bad effect on morale, including the morale of their immediate super-
visors. In addition, since jobs throughout the wage structure have many
common elements among firms, people can move readily to good alter-
native employment. These problems are forcefully expressed in an
internal memorandum on wage policy distributed in 1951 to the top
management of one of the firms studied.
The financial problems of these groups [in jobs above the hiring
level] have an adverse effect on the morale of all members at non-
supervisory levels as well as on the managers with whom they discuss
their affairs. These groups have relatively long service with a low
turnover ratio. In general, they have acquired skills which are valu-
able to the Company and they constitute the backbone of our non-
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supervisory office force. They have roots in the Company and have
little desire to seek employment in new fields.
We are thus beginning to be a training school which furnishes skilled
employees to other industries. For example, we are hiring semi-skilled
Burroughs machine operators in the range from $30 to $35.21 per
week. After six months to a year, these girls as skilled operators can
earn $40 a week or better in other industries. We have verified these
rates with Burroughs. Several girls have proved it for us by leaving
for better paying jobs.
A job evaluation and job classification system, if approved by the
Government and adopted by the Company, could enable us to price
our wage rates competitively. It would permit us to re-classify em-
ployees who have successfully learned skills in the Company.
At the present time, the Personnel Department has notice of fifteen
to twenty girls who are considering jobs in other companies. Many
of these girls do not easily make the decision to quit. They feel that
there are many advantages in working for us; they have many per-
sonal ties in the departments where they now work. Cost of living
and merit increases, plus notice that the Company is actively seeking
a plan which will permit wage adjustments, will persuade many girls
in this situation to remain with the Company.
In summary, the wage strategies pursued by firms could all be classed
under the general heading, "pay whatever the market forces you to
pay," but this was interpreted in different ways by different firms. The
differences in approach apparently were related to differences in size,
type of business, and immediate employment trends. The dimensions
of difference were the quality of help desired, as related to position
in the community wage structure, and the extent to which the firm
tried to anticipate or follow general rate changes.
EXCERPTS FROM THE EXPERIENCES OF INDIVIDUAL FIRMS
A Prominent Insurance Company
This firm's employment of clerical help increased moderately be-
tween 1945 and 1950 but then rose sharply, by about 20 per cent,
between 1951 and 1953. Employment at the end of 1950 was below
the level of a year earlier, but this reflected inability in the last half
of the year to get the quality of help desired rather than a slowing
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down of the firm's need for additional people. Traditionally the firm
maintained individual rates with no over-all plan for the wage struc-
ture. The hiring rate was consistently among the lowest for the firms
surveyed in this study.
The organization began to change during World War II and, by the
end of the war, the employment department had been expanded to a
small personnel department with its main emphasis on recruiting activi-
ties. The firm occupies a prominent building, and in the immediate
postwar years was able to fill the bulk of its jobs from a steady stream
of walk-in applicants. Gradually, however, the firm was forced to seek
other sources of labor. This need was dramatized for the firm by the
end of 1950 in the form of many unfilled vacancies. In 1951, the per-
sonnel department was again reorganized and one of the important
operating men was given the full-time job of personnel director, a post
at the policy-making level with access to the firm's top management
group.
His early efforts to move the firm's hiring rate to a higher position
in the community wage structure were rebuffed. Concern within the
firm for the impact on other rates of changing the hiring rate forced
him to present an over-all plan for the firm's wage structure. The
arguments against it ran: "we can't make rapid increases in clerical
rates when our policy holders pay fixed premiums"; and "turn-over is
high among our employees for reasons unrelated to wage rates." Argu-
ments such as these prevailed for several years but eventually gave way,
as an accumulation of evidence led to a rather dramatic shift in wage
policy.
The evidence behind the policy shift was of several types. Quantita-
tive information on personnel shortages was kept. Interviews with job
applicants nourished the suspicion that the walk-in applicants were
increasingly people who had been "picked over" by other firms.
Operating supervisors complained about low quality and the increasing
difficulty of maintaining standards for attendance, punctuality, and
tidiness. Efforts to recruit actively in the high schools met with only
fair success. Company recruiters reported remarks of high school guid-
ance counsellors, such as, "Why should they go to you when they can
get more somewhere else?" An analysis was made of turnover which
showed that one-fourth to one-third of voluntary quits were connected
directly or indirectly with unfavorable wage comparisons. This per-
centage exerted considerable leverage in a period of labor shortage.
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Finally, an extensive and detailed wage survey was made for the firm
by an outside group, and its results were expressed in the rate changes
in the new wage policy.
For this firm conditions in the labor market forced a broad recon-
sideration of company personnel policy, including wage policy, on a
somewhat reluctant management. The personnel director of the firm is
careful to point out that "money isn't everything" and that the changes
made were far more extensive than a simple change in the hiring rate.
Nevertheless, there is no doubt that wages were an essential part of
the over-all package of "net advantages" this firm was selling to its
employees, and that satisfactory sales were most difficult to achieve
without a relatively attractive hiring rate.
Another Large Insurance Compantj
This firm experienced slow growth in permanent clerical employees
in the decade following World War II but did expand considerably
its use of part-time workers to meet seasonal needs. Personnel work
at the company had been carefully organized during World War II
and the activities were in the hands of responsible men in the firm.
The firm's over-all wage-quality strategy was more carefully thought
through than in most of the other firms, and it illustrates an important
strategy alternative.
The firm consciously pursued a policy of paying a little below what
it regarded as the market rate, knowing that the average quality of its
people might suffer somewhat as a result. Its experience showed, how-
ever, that some good-quality girls came there "by chance," so that
enough promotable material usually was available to the firm. Where
this was not the case, it did not hesitate to hire from outside the firm.
An effort was made to organize most jobs so that they required little
training. On the whole, the firm felt that others paying high rates had
a higher average quality than they could use fully and were really
wasting money.
The firm participated in wage surveys made by other firms in the
area but relied primarily on surveys made by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics on the grounds that BLS surveys were broader and more
systematic. It did not change rates, however, on the basis of survey
results alone. The survey helped to decide how much to change, but
a change was not made unless the firm's own experience suggested
the need for it. A primary indicator was "bleeding" in the rate ranges.
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When they found that they could recruit a high proportion of girls
only at the hiring rate reserved for "exceptional" people, a need for a
change in the rate range was indicated. In addition, the firm recorded
such indicators as the number of interviews per hire, the turnover,
and the number of unfilled vacancies. The personnel people were a
little suspicious of their own figures on unfilled vacancies and felt that
perhaps the vacancies were not really there—until loud complaints
came from department managers. The same could be said about quality
standards for new people. At any rate, they relied heavily on indica-
tors from the firm's own experience before grudgingly moving the
wage rate up.
A Large Bank
This firm ranks among the larger and more rapidly growing em-
ployers of clerical labor in the area. To fill its large accessions each
year, the firm has turned to and relied primarily on the supply of
labor entering the market each year from high schools. Its well-organ-
ized personnel department makes numerous visits to high schools
each year to persuade teachers, high school guidance counsellors, and
students that this bank is a good place to work.
In the view of the personnel department, the firm's large-scale and
aggressive recruiting demanded a hiring rate slightly above average.
In addition, the timing of the firm's hiring made it difficult for the
firm to await adverse experience of its own before changing its rates.
It was deemed essential to make a large proportion of the yearly acces-
sions out of the group graduating each year from high schools. Thus,
the firm felt it necessary to follow an anticipatory and analytical ap-
proach to wage changes.
The firm estimated each year the labor requirements of major firms
in the area and the number of high school graduates who would be
looking for clerical work. On the basis of these estimates and a "feeling"
of what was happening to wages as seen by other employers, employ-
ment agencies, and high school guidance counsellors, the firm decided
upon the rate range with which it would enter the market. The ob-
jective was to appear in a leadership role. This wage policy was aggres-
sively supplemented by other nonwage appeals and by efforts to bring
girls into the firm before graduation on a part-time basis.
In addition to general efforts to keep costs down, two types of re-
straining forces were operating in this case. First, there are only a few
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really large firms recruiting in the Boston area high schools, and they
feared that really aggressive bidding for the high school graduates
would only run up the price. This possibility was discussed among
personnel people and no doubt served to moderate the forces of com-
petition. The other restraining force was the problem of maintaining
an equitable internal wage structure in the firm. Rapid increases in
hiring rates would mean either increases all along the line or growing
discontent among longer-service employees. Such a situation, it was
felt in this finn, could easily lead to unionization of these employees, an
outcome clearly viewed as most undesirable.
All in all, however, the firm was a wage leader both in timing and
level. Its wage policy illustrates an adaptation to the structure of supply
on which it drew in a period of labor shortage.
A Small Bank
This firm employed a little over 100 people in 1956 and had experi-
enced a slow growth in the decade following World War II. Conse-
quently, it hired only a small number of people each year. Its hiring
rate was consistently about average among the firms covered by the
study, and turnover was the lowest of any firm included in this study.
Adjustments in rates were made from time to time on the basis of
wage survey material collected by large employers and made available
to those who cooperated in the survey. The firm relied almost entirely
on internal recruiting, using its own employees as its best sources of
information and advertisement. It had no personnel department and
no labor supply difficulties and was, to a certain extent, a little be-
wildered by all the shouting about labor shortages.
Patterns of Job Choice Among Clerical Workers
Information about employer personnel policies and wage decisions was
supplemented by study of the labor force activities of a sample of
clerical workers. Work histories were collected by interviews with 158
employees of the thirteen firms studied, each at the time on the payroll
of a bank or insurance company. The names were drawn at random
from lists supplied by the firms, with 10 names selected from each small
firm and 15 from each large one.
As shown in Table 10 those interviewed were predominantly under
twenty-four years of age, single, and residents of households headed
by parents, guardians, or other relatives. A significant minority, one-
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TABLE 10
STATISTICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE SAMPLE
Number Percentage
AGE DISTRIBUTION








Widowed, Separated, or divorced 8 5.1
158 100.0
HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS
Head of household 27 17.1
Not head of household
With parents, guardians or
other relatives 106 67.1
With husband 25 15.8
158 100.0
fourth to one-third, were over twenty-five years of age and had ha-
portant responsibilities for maintenance of the household.
ORIENTATION TO CLERICAL WORK AND CONFIDENCE IN ITS AVAILABILITY
These 158 people had held jobs in 411 firms since leaving school and
343 of these jobs (83 per cent) were in clerical work. Of them, 122
had held jobs exclusively in clerical occupations since leaving school.
In contrast, before leaving school, 80 per cent of these individuals had
held nonclerical jobs, for the most part, in retail sales in stores or service
work in drugstores, ice cream parlors, or similar establishments. The
interviews were full of unsolicited adverse comments about jobs in
trade and service industries and, to a less extent, about jobs in factories
(see Appendix A for examples).
The experience of those interviewed in making job shifts fostered
confidence in the ready availability of work (Table 11). About 80
per cent of the job shifts were voluntary. An increase in salary was
associated with three-fourths of the shifts when the worker stayed in
the labor market. In 60 per cent of the cases the individual spent less
than two weeks between jobs, and 85 per cent of the individuals had
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TABLE 11
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF REASONS FOR LEAVING JOBS
Reasons for
Leaving
Current Ageof Worker Total
Under 2020—2425—3435—59Reasons
INVOLUNTARY
7.1 23.1 13.6 20.9 18.3
VOLUNTARY, REMAINING IN LABOR MARKET
Salary and opportunity to
advance 21.4 18.3 22.3 17.4 19.4
Nonsalary economic
advantages 0 1.9 1.0 6.1 2.9
Working conditions 7.1 8.7 8.7 4.3 7.1
Personal relationships 21.4 14.4 19.4 8.7 14.6
Type of work 25.0 17.3 16.5 9.6 15.1
Other 10.7 5.8 8.7 5.2 6.9
VOLUNTARY, LEAVING LABOR MARKET
Marriage and pregnancy 0 1.0 2.9 8.7 4.0
Return to school 7.1 2.9 2.9 6.1 4.3
Change of husband's
residence 0 3.8 0 3.5 2.3
Other 0 2.9 3.9 9.6 5.1
Total reasons 8.0 29.7 29.4 32.9 100.0
NOTE: More than one answer possible per person per job.
DESCRIPTION OF CATEGORIES
Salary and opportunity to advance, consideration of salary or a chance for
promotion.
Nonsalary economic advantage, consideration of job security and fringe
benefits of various sorts.
Working conditions, preferences with respect to the number of working hours,
days of work, and the type of physical plant.
Personal relationships, the social satisfactions derived from working in a firm,
including those related to the nature of supervision, type of co-workers, and the
presence of friends.
Type of work, for which workers indicated dissatisfaction with the inherent
nature of the work they were performing.
never spent more than one month out of a job while still in the labor
market. For about 20 per cent of the job shifts, a new job had been
lined up by the individual before she left the old job.
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METHODS OF LOCATING JOBS AND ACQUIRING JOB INFORMATION
The sources by which those interviewed located jobs are shown in
Table 12. The outstanding fact shown by this table is the importance
of market intermediaries and sources of information which tend to
expose the job applicant to knowledge of a range of job alternatives.
The most important channels of information were schools and private
TABLE 12










Schools 21.0 16.3 15.0 12.4 15.5 67a
Private employment
agencies 10.5 10.2 15.9 16.5 13.4 58
State employment
service 5.3 3.4 3.7 4.1 3.9 17
Newspaper
advertisements 0 15.0 20.6 7.4 12.3 53
Common
awareness 8.8 8.8 7.5 9.1 8.6 37
Girl friend 31.6 23.8 15.9 19.8 21.8 94b
Relatives, family
friends, and
contacts 21.0 16.3 16.8 19.0 17.8 77c
Company recruiters 0 3.4 9.3 9.1 2.5 11
Other 1.8 2.7 3.7 7.4 4.2 18
Total sources 13.2 34.0 24.8 28.0 100.0
Number of jobs 57 147 107 121 432
NOTE: More than one answer possible per job and per person.
a High School in 32 cases.
b Friend worked at the firm in 59 cases.
CRelativeor family contact worked at the firm in 57 cases.
employment agencies, and if the State Employment Service and news-
paper advertisements are added, these channels were the means by
which individuals found almost half the jobs identffied in this study.
As in the case of industrial labor markets, friends and relatives were
also prime sources of job information, accounting for about 40 per cent
of the jobs identified. Nevertheless, the importance here of relatively
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well-organized channels of information for locating jobs stands in
sharp contrast to findings in industrial labor markets.°
Studies of industrial labor markets have shown the typical industrial
worker to be poorly informed about job alternatives, even when in the
process of changing jobs. In this study, too, the majority of workers
did not seem well informed or thoughtful in their labor market be-
havior. In about one-third of the job shifts identified in this study the
person interviewed knew almost nothing about the job before applying
and knew only the general type of work involved in another 40 per
cent of the shifts. In about one-fourth of the cases, however, the person
knew about the general salary levels at the firm and about some aspects
of the working conditions before making application.
In about two-thirds of the cases, the individual had no specific knowl-
edge about jobs other than the one taken at the time of the job shift.
In about one-fourth of the job shifts, however, the individual made
more than one application, indicating she had explored alternatives
to some degree. Three-fourths of those interviewed, when asked the
additional question whether they knew of any places using clerical
help which they considered "good" or "bad" places to work, identified
firms other than their own and gave explicit reasons for the good or
bad evaluation. A significant minority, perhaps one-fourth to one-third,
of these clerical workers, then, possessed some knowledge of job alter-
natives when they made job shifts, and a somewhat greater number
had enough knowledge about other firms to make a loose judgment
about the desirability of working at these other firms.
FACIORSINJOB CHOICE
An effort was made in the interviews to identify in a general way the
preference structure of these clerical workers. They were asked why
they had left earlier jobs, what had led them to choose their present
10Froma study of the San Francisco Bay area labor market, Maim also noted
the sharp contrast between channels of recruitment for manual and clerical work-
ers. He studied employer recruiting practices and covered a wider range of indus-
tries and sizes of firms than this study does. High schools were not as important
as they appear to be here, but formal channels do predominate in the case of
clerical workers. F. Theodore Maim, "Recruiting Patterns and the Functioning
of Labor Markets," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, July 1954, pp. 507-525.
The study of clerical workers in Madison, Wisconsin, also found formal channels
to be of great importance in that labor market. Eighty per cent of the jobs on
which workers reported were located through market intermediaries, with the Public
Employment Service playing an important role. See Conant, "Wages and Behavior
of Firms and Workers," p. 117.
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positions, their satisfactions and dissatisfactions in their current jobs,
and what they considered to be the characteristics of "good" and "bad"
places of employment. Here, too, the general picture obtained is not
very different from that identffied in other studies. Individuals vary
in what they want from a job and, in all cases, they consider more than
the financial side. In only a minority of job shifts were salary and other
nonsalary economic attributes of a job singled out as the primary reason
for taking the new job.
The picture for job terminations, however, is somewhat different.
Two-thirds of the individuals who left jobs did so voluntarily and
stayed in the labor market. Reasons given for leaving were, in about
one-third of the cases, dissatisfaction with salary or other economic
attributes of the job, in 45percent, unsatisfactory personal relation-
ships on the job or dissatisfaction with the type of work. Of the 158
women interviewed, 60 said they intended to leave the firm for which
they were working; more than half, 34, gave as the reason dissatis-
faction with their current salary or with their chances for increases in
salary. In describing good and bad places to work, about 40 per cent
of the 158 specified economic advantages as identifying a good job,
though only 18 per cent cited that reason in identifying bad jobs.
The picture of employee behavior that emerges in this labor market
seems broadly consistent with the belief of firms that raising wages
and improving working conditions were essential to attract and retain
employees. Almost half the jobs taken by the sample of workers studied
were located through reasonably well-organized information pools.
These pools provide their users with knowledge of a range of job alter-
natives and with rough standards for evaluating salaries. A signfficant
minority of girls, about 20 per cent, knew about jobs other than the one
they accepted and had at least a general idea of the economic dimen-
sions of jobs applied for. To be sure, most of the workers made no
pretence to a systematic exploration of the job market. But in many
instances some market intermediary did that for them and, in a sub-
stantial minority of instances, workers conducted some search on their
own.
This study suggests that financial incentives play a significant role
in the preference structure of these clerical workers, although within
a strong framework of other job objectives. It is apparent that these
girls place a high value on their working environment and on the status
of the work they do. Most of them seem to have rejected consciously
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factory work or selling, where many of them had earlier experience on
part-time jobs, thus narrowing their range of job choice. Within this
range, however, a substantial minority, again about 20 to 25 per cent,
emphasized salary and general financial considerations in their reasons
for leaving and taking specific jobs, their notions of what makes for
a good or a bad job, and their intentions about their current job.
In a tight labor market, where firms are struggling to attract workers
and avoid turnover, the behavior of this minority of workers can have a
significant impact. The initial job choices and subsequent movements
of these workers punish the low-wage firm and encourage those em-
ployers who maintain salaries in line with or above their competitors
in the labor market.
Role of Market Intermediaries
Because market intermediaries appeared to play an important role
here as sources of job information, both to firms seeking employees
and to workers seeking jobs, their methods of operation were also
studied, with emphasis on high school placement activities." The
information about private employment agencies is limited, since these
organizations were reluctant to provide desired information. Interviews
were held with nineteen high school counsellors engaged in placement
activities—fourteen associated with high schools in principal Boston
suburbs and five with the Boston school systems, both public and
parochial.
APPROACH TO PLACEMENT ACTIVrTIES
High schools vary considerably in the amount of effort devoted to
placement activities and in the sophistication of their approach. In
general, however, the view was widespread that satisfactory placement
in jobs was a growing responsibility of the schools. The approach of
individual guidance counsellors varied somewhat in the degree of
control assumed. In some cases, the approach was rather authoritarian:
the counsellor tried to place an individual girl on a particular job with-
out giving her much information about alternatives. The more prevalent
view, however, was that girls should get from the initial placement
process some skill in ways of finding jobs. Thus, at some schools girls
11ThePublic Employment Service apparently did not play an important role
here. In contrast, a study in Madison, Wisconsin found there that it is a principal
channel of job information for clerical workers. See Conant, "Wages and Behavior
of Firms and Workers," pp. 119-122.
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were told about a number of jobs, occasionally given a list of firms
to visit, and were urged to supplement basic information available at
the school with the kind of information obtainable only on the job site.
ACQUISITION OF INFORMATION AND ITS DISPERSAL
Every counsellor interviewed was convinced that the market for clerical
help was extremely tight. Many more companies than ever before were
taking the initiative in contacting high schools, and placement people
were frequently unable to recommend anyone to fill particular vacan-
cies. As one of them expressed it, "We have many more calls for jobs
than we have girls to fill them."
As a result of their contacts with firms, guidance counsellors ac-
cumulated much information about available job openings and the
basic employment terms for them. In some schools, the information
about openings was posted on a bulletin board; in others, guidance
counsellors talked over a range of possible alternatives with individual
girls. Information filtered out through teachers in the business courses
and through discussions among the girls themselves. As one man
noted, "The girls talk a lot among themselves about salaries and when
jobs in firms paying lower salaries are offered, they refuse them."
The result, it seemed, was that enough information became generally
available to set a sort of salary norm for a particular year.
Some placement officers were much more aggressive than others in
feeding information back to firms and in commenting critically about
low rates. Ten of the nineteen interviewed volunteered comments about
such action, as this typical statement: "I won't send a girl to a place
like that because they exploit girls by paying them too low. They tell
me the girls aren't worth it, but I say if you want them you'll have to
pay it, because they can get it somewhere else." Many small firms
call in for help and say in effect, "You know the salary schedules; tell
me what I should pay and I'll pay it." Thus, the information collected
at the high schools moved out to the demand as well as to the supply
side of the market.
All the schools emphasized their desire to place the better girls in
what were considered the better jobs, as rewards for better than average
performance in the classroom. Better jobs were not defined exclusively
in terms of better pay, but pay appeared to be one obvious attribute.
The result of this process was to sort out the labor supply according to
a quality dimension and to provide a broad association in the placement
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process of quality and pay. Some quotations may help give the flavor
of this aspect of placement activities: "My goal is to give the better job
to the better girl. If good jobs don't come in, then I'll take the initiative
and shop around for them." "I tell the outstanding kids to hold out for
the better job; I tell them you ought to get a top-notch job. Don't be
in too much of a hurry. Hold off. Talk it over with us. We'll interpret
the significance of a job offered to you."
PRIVATEAGENCIES
The information obtained about private employment agencies is not
sufficient for a detailed statement about their operations. These agencies
are apparently concerned primarily with placement into the high-
paying jobs requiring definite skills and experience. Their concern
about their reputations with employees as well as employers led them
to avoid handling poor openings. They seemed willing to tell an
employer when his rate was below that offered by others, a fact con-
firmed by statements made in interviews with employer representatives.
Employers pointed out, in addition, that the agency's fee is roughly
proportionate to the rate of pay on the job.
One employer related the following incident, implying that it illus-
trated a frequent pattern of events:
We phone the agency asking for a girl and saying that the pay is
$40 a week. The agency claims it cannot get a girl unless the pay
is $45. So we say if she is good we might pay $45. Let her come in
and we'll see. Then the agency runs an advertisement that it has a
job paying $45. This attracts girls to the agency, which tells them
that that job has been filled but there is another that pays less,
although the exact amount will be determined when the girl applies
for the job. The result is the agency causes the employer to make a
tentative offer of $45andthis figure has raised the girl's expectations,
as does the suggestion by the agency that the employer is willing
to bargain. In addition, girls look at the ads and get the idea that
$45 is something to shoot at for a job like this.
SUMMARY
In general, the information obtained from high school guidance coun-
sellors tends to confirm the impression of employers and, to a lesser
extent of employees, that the counsellors play an important role in this
market. They appear to have some direct influence on selection of jobs
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for the best girls. They counsel girls not to take the first job offered
but to look around, though they deplore the extent to which this advice
is ignored. From the standpoint of their effect on the labor market,
the most important of their activities is their almost automatic acquisi-
tion of information. This information, which becomes available at the
time of year when most hiring takes place, is widely shared on both
sides of the labor market. Even if girls do not make a systematic search
of job alternatives, the process of pooling and sharing information
tends to perform that function for them. Thus, the placement activities
of high schools improve the operation of this labor market.
Conclusions
A tight market for female clerical workers in Boston banks and in-
surance companies during the post-World War II decade has been
identified. The reactions of a group of firms and their employees to
that labor market and the role played in it of various market inter-
mediaries, especially high school guidance counsellors, have been
described. Five points of special interest emerge from the study.
1. The supply side of the market is characterized by the addition
each year of a large group of workers flowing from high schools into
jobs. Most of the large firms and some smaller ones wish to attract a
share of this group. The resulting focus of competition among firms
at a point in time and at common locations has led to ready wage
comparisons and has increased the upward pressure on wages. Some
firms followed a policy of raising their rates in anticipation of this
competitive struggle. Firms with lagging rates of pay felt the pressure
most strongly, of course, often hearing about their position in the
community wage structure directly from the guidance counsellors and
feeling the impact of labor shortages in the form of a lower average
quality of applicants. The structure of supply created more of a "market
place" than is usually found and, in turn, the operation of the market
place added knowledge to and improved the operation of that labor
market.
2. Formal channels for finding out about job openings were more
important for the clerical workers covered in this study than is appar-
ently the case for manual workers. In particular, high school guidance
counsellors play an important role in the placement of high school girls
in initial jobs. Perhaps the most important function of the counsellors
was their assembly of information about the market, which flowed to
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both the supply and demand sides of the market. This information-pool
role is worthy of note now, when the number of people coming out
of high schools each year will be increasing rapidly. High schools can
help individuals find satisfactory jobs and improve the operation of
labor markets in the long run by helping individuals understand better
the process of finding a job.
3. The responses of firms to that tight labor market were diverse.
As in other studies, much more than a simple wage response was found.
The firms were able to moderate the impact of labor scarcity on wages
by increasing their buying effort, lowering their quality standards, and
broadening their sources of labor supply. These devices are a parallel
in the labor market to efforts by firms to differentiate their goods and
services for sale in the product market. Many of these nonwage re-
sponses are reversible and their use injects an element of flexibility in
a firm's adjustments to changing labor market conditions.
4. Most of the workers studied made no systematic search of job
alternatives as they shifted from one employer to another, and many
of them were uninformed about alternatives that might be open.
Nevertheless, a substantial minority of workers did appear to be rea-
sonably well informed and willing to move to jobs with better pay and
comparable working conditions. In a tight labor market the leverage of
such a group can have an important impact on the wage policies of
firms. The impact, while concentrated on jobs at the hiring level,
extends throughout the wage structure and reduces the monopsony
power of firms over employees with long service and skills specialized
to the firm. This extension operates through internal comparisons and
the impact on morale of what appears to employees and their super-
visors as inequitable treatment.
5. This market does not, of course, operate in isolation, free of the
forces at work in the economy generally or in the Boston area. Never-
theless, its responses to these forces operate through a mechanism
with a basically internal orientation. The changes in personnel policy
and in wages made by the firms were stimulated by their own condi-
tions of labor supply. Certainly, then, one cannot expect economic
events in other industries and locations to have an automatic effect on
this labor market. If the event affects the demand for or supply of
clerical workers in Boston, as did the expansion of government offices
in Boston resulting from the upsurge of activity during the Korean
conflict, then a response here may be expected.
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In the post-World War II period, the study of labor markets has led
gradually to a shift in attitude toward them on the part of labor
economists. Research has revealed the complexities—the barriers that
often impede the flow of people to jobs of their choice, the extent of
ignorance about alternative employment opportunities, and the broad
range of motives to which people respond in their labor force activities.
If the initial reaction to the findings of research was disenchantment
with a stripped-down model of the labor market drawn from economic
theory, subsequent reflection has led to a more sophisticated view. In
this later effort some of the classic works have turned out to be valuable,
after all. Charles A. Myers, for example, quotes with approval from
the works of Marshall and Hicks, who "analyzed with great insight
the operation of labor markets, as distinct from product markets."2
And Myers notes, referring to the United States, that "personal and
institutional factors undoubtedly did impede movement in certain local
labour markets and at particular times; but the broad waves of move-
ment did correspond to those suggested by the theoretical model."3
The effort now is to use the richness of empirical detail on hand—with
economic theory as a guide, but not a master—to distinguish among the
many types of situations under which the price of labor is determined.
This study of a white-collar labor market may be portrayed, then, as
one piece of data in this broad effort.
Appendix
EXCERPTS FROM EMPLOYEE INTERVIEWS
A. Reasons for Working:
I guess I just wanted to feel independent.
I had to—your mother supports you long enough and then you have
to go to work. I didn't have anyone but myself to support when I
started working; I guess that I just didn't like the idea of "hanging
around" when everyone else is working.
Well, I wasn't going to college... youjust don't go to school for
twelve years and then hang around... yougot to have money. I
can't say to my mother I won't work and you got to support me.
12CharlesA. Myers, "Labor Market Theory and Empirical Research," in John T.
Dunlop, The Theory of Wage Determination, London, MacMillan, 1957, p. 317. 'Ibid.,p. 326.
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It's not fair and I want to work. I guess every girl does. She wants
to have clothes and buy things she wants...andyou meet
people.
When you graduate from high school you can do three things; you
can go to college, get married, or go to work. I didn't go to college
or get married, so I went to work.
I need the money to help out at home. I wouldn't stay at home and
loaf. I'd be very bored.
Well, I didn't have to...butI was excited about getting a job and
having my own money...itwas just the natural thing to do.
Money is the main reason: I have to live and I can't live off my
parents forever. I think that when you work there are more things
that you can do...you'reindependent... anyway,eventually
everyone has to go out and work. It's good to know some kind of
work in case some day you really have to work.
The first time I went to work it was just for kicks, you know some-
thing to do...afterI graduated from high school there was nothing
to do but go to work.
I didn't know anyone there. It meant being alone all day. I didn't
want to sit around. Now I'm working because we want to save for
a down payment on a house. I'll work for one or one and a half
years and then stop, because we want a family in another year or so.
I had to return to work. I was supporting myself. My husband and
I broke up.. .divorced.
B. Reasons' for Selection of Clerical Work
My mother and father wanted me to work in an office. ..they'd
like me to work in an office and not in a factory...sheknows
what it's like...theywork hard in a factory...
Iwouldn't want a factory job, I got a high school diploma.
When nursing was out I figured that clerical work was something
that I was capable of. That's the only course that they offered in
high school besides the college course and I didn't want to go to
college....
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It's the best kind of a job a girl can get. If you say you work in
a factory it doesn't impress people. They say anyone can get you
work like that...andan office is clean.
I didn't want to go any farther in school...Ididn't really like
school that much. If I went to college I'd have to take courses that
I didn't like...clericalwork seemed most interesting to me. I was
always fascinated by people that could type. I wouldn't want the
assembly line. It doesn't seem like the right type of job for me; no
intelligence is needed in that work. I've gone through school with
good marks and I wanted a job that would become a challenge
to me.
For no special reason, I don't think. I knew that if I took the com-
mercial course in school I could always get a job.
The reason I do clerical work is that I'm not trained for any-
thing.... Ionly had a clerical course... alittle in high school.
They're the only skills I can do. I'm not interested in office work,
but that's all I can do now.
I think I thought I would get real working benefit out of the com-
mercial course...thatit would help me to get a job. If you aren't
going to college this would be about the only thing I could get into.
I didn't really consider anything else.
I just sort of wandered into it. One thing leads to another. You get
one job working in an office and then you look for the same thing.
I like a little prestige in my job.... Ithink office work is a little
more respectable for a girl. ... no,I wouldn't think of working in a
factory...it'stoo rough for me. ..boththe work and the people.
My dad's not working. He was laid off in the mill. That's why he
saidoffice work or a bank or insurance company would be
steadier...thebig reason for going to the bank was security.
I don't know why I went into office work. I guess it was because
that's what I took in school.
COMMENTS
GEORGE H. HILDEBRAND, Cornell University
George Shultz underscores our lack of knowledge about the operation
of nonunion labor markets, especially in the white-collar occupations.
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His effort to fill the gap is highly appropriate. Such work is essential
for testing and improving wage theory, for comprehending wage be-
havior, for evaluating union impacts and processes of transmission of
wage changes, and for a better grounding of economic policies.
What kind of model, or image, of the labor market is suggested by
Shultz's findings? Obviously, it lacks the over-all centralization of wage
determination that might be achieved under over-all product-market
unionism, an employer association, or government regulation. While
the market is not competitive enough to yield a single uniform rate, the
dispersion of wage rates for comparable jobs is surprisingly narrow.
If, further, allowance is made for differences in personal efficiency and
capacity, which Shultz says do exist, then, expressed as efficiency
wages, the band of rates would be even narrower. At the same time,
there is sensitive interdependence between the hiring rate for the
bottom job (filing clerk, class B) and thOse for the upper tiers of the
structure, while all the jobs are quite clear cut and uniform among
firms. Moreover, the practice seems to be to hire in at the bottom and to
promote from within—interesting in itself as acceptance of the qualified
seniority principle, even without unionism.
Explanation of this interdependence of job rates attests to the power
of competition on both sides of the market. For the employees, com-
pression invokes discontent, lessened efficiency, and more voluntary
quits at the higher levels. For the employers, these responses may be
summed up as reduced labor supply. To this the obvious reaction is
to increase rates across the board, adding more to total wage costs
than would selective increases and at the same time substantially
increasing total costs, because of the high ratio of labor costs to total
expenses in this field. The employers, accordingly, are reluctant to
increase wage rates, preferring where possible to resolve the problem
through nonwage channels. In the end, this approach has proved
permanent, although external pressures have nonetheless compelled a
steady postwar rise in wage rates.
Freed though it is of centralized wage control, Shultz's market is
by no means as poorly held together as that for much nonunion
factory labor. Yet it has no union. Wages have risen rapidly and con-
sistently, showing strong uniformity rather than diversity. The reason
is that unionism is not the only way to introduce an organized market.
In Shultz's case, what he calls "market intermediaries" serve as effective
brokers to bring buyers and sellers together. Granted that the role they
147A NONUNION MARKET
play is not as effective as that exerted in the stock exchange, it con-
tributes powerfully to the forces of mobility. In other words, competi-
tion works, and apparently works quite well, in this market. Thur
wages and working conditions together strongly influence the alloca-
tion of labor among the participating firms, meaning that demand and
supply relationships shape their hiring policies in a competitive manner.
In the short period, aggregative supply appears fairly inelastic, but
even in the longer run it was inelastic enough relative to increasing
demand to compel a substantial rise in average rates, together with
many indirect responses. These latter responses include: formation or
development of personnel departments and policies, increased recruit-
ing efforts, reduced hiring standards, improved nonpecuniary attrac-
tions, formalized job and wage structures, enlargement of the labor
pooi, and efforts to economize labor, particularly through substitution
of capital investment in laborsaving devices.
The worker population in Shultz's study is not homogeneous in
quality or efficiency. To attract and to hold labor, each employer has
a choice: to be a wage leader and so "advertise" a favorable market
position, or to be a follower and trade inferiority for lower rates and
employment costs. Interestingly enough, Shultz's evidence suggests
operation of a process of introduction and transmission of wage in-
creases like that found by Reynolds in his New Haven study. Going
annual increases and orbits of coercive comparison have existed despite
the absence of unionism. Equally important, tightening labor supply
has even compelled the laggards to make increases to thwart the
adverse effects of higher quit rates, diminished numbers and quality
of new applicants, and heightened problems of discipline and per-
formance. Clearly, too, relatively persistent full employment in the
Boston area contributed strongly to tight supply—cutting down the
supposed flow of entrants from other industries and increasing the
propensity to migrate outward.
The conclusion that emerges from all this is that, although the
simplified model of perfect competition will not do as an adequate
account of wage determination and market behavior, nonetheless in
the modified neoclassical version developed by Marshall and Hicks
we have a satisfactory conceptual apparatus for extracting several very
useful predictive implications—for this kind of market.
Consider the evidence. The rise in the derived demand for this kind
of labor compelled a steady advance of wages in the "industry," work-
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ing as it did against relatively inelastic supply. Wages did not fall, so
supply could not have been negatively elastic. The theory says that
wages have to rise under these conditions, because supply depends
upon the ability to pull employees from competing uses in other indus-
tries and upon the annual accretion of new entrants from the schools.
Further, the market is well enough organized, and the participants
sufficiently lacking in power to affect price, that wages at the hiring
grade showed a strong tendency to equalize, particularly in the effi-
ciency sense. All of the employers were under strong pressure to raise
wages, and all did so. Obviously, too, supply to this industry was
strongly influenced by the general state of labor demand and supply.
There was substantial interdependence also among occupational rates
within the industry. This, too, the theory leads us to expect: if the
wages for experienced and for inexperienced girls were equal, there
would be a shortage of the former and a surplus of the latter. Accord-
ingly, competition would restore a differential, responding to the differ-
ence in marginal productivities of the two grades of workers. Finally,
as the cost of labor rose to these employers, they were induced to
economize—by reorganizing jobs, by resort to typing pools, and by
improved or new equipment.
We need not go all the way with Hicks to hold that generally this
"is quite a good simplified model of the labour market," or that so far
as "general tendencies are concerned, wages do turn out on the whole
very much as if they were determined in this manner."l For, after all,
this is a special kind of labor market, with underlying conditions not
found everywhere. But we can agree with him that while the "labour
market is not a perfect market; [and] the equalising forces do not
act quickly and easily,...neverthelessthey do act."2
The criticisms I have concern mainly matters I would like to
have seen explored or developed more fully. Since Shultz is reporting
here about only part of a large-scale inquiry, most of my comments
should not be taken as adverse.
First, I think a sharp and explicit contrast should be drawn between
this particular market and those with labor unions. There are marked
differences, and some interesting similarities. Rates and working con-
ditions in Shultz's market are not collectively negotiated. The employers
have much more discretion, particularly in responding to changed
1 The Theory of Wages, New York, Peter Smith, 1948, p. 5.
2 ibid., p. 76.
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conditions of supply. The timing of wage increases, their size and
distribution, and their diffusion among firms are not affected by the
duration and expiration of trade agreements. Relative to the craft-
union market, there appear to be no formal restrictions upon entry,
while movement within the industry is not regulated. Actually, internal
movement apparently has the dual character observed in the market
for unionized factory labor: up the occupational ladder within the
establishment and laterally between employers, particularly for start-
ing jobs. It is also noteworthy that, with the transition to relatively
continuous full employment, these employers were compelled to bor-
row some of the practices of factory unionism: to replace personal
rates with job rates, to design a suitable internal structure of occupa-
tional rates, to treat problems of grievances and discipline more for-
mally, and to formulate hiring standards and to adjust them to ease
or tightness of labor supply.
Second, let me consider the orbit or contour problem. Although
Shultz recognizes the influence of forces external to this industry, he
contends somewhat obscurely that its labor market is an internally
oriented mechanism, not automatically affected by wage patterns else-
where. As he puts it, "The personnel policy and wage changes made by
the firms were stimulated by their own conditions of labor supply."
Does this mean that the forces of supply are internal to the firm, or
internal to the industry? And either way, is it true? To the firm, supply
is an external force, to which it must adapt. To the industry, supply is
partly an internal influence, but not wholly so. Not all new entrants
into the clerical market go into banking and insurance, while those
already in this field are not entirely indifferent to wages for these
occupations in other industries in the Boston area. If the converse
were true, why then emphasize the postwar advent of a tight market
as the primary cause of the many changes in employment policy noted
by Shultz? Obviously the supply curve of labor to this industry has not
been perfectly elastic, or it would not have raised wages as its demand
for labor expanded. Should we infer that external factors have done
nothing to make supply even less elastic? If wages outside the industry
had not advanced postwar, would it have made no difference to the
rate of increase within the industry? I do not think so.
Perhaps Shultz's point is simply that absence of unionism invokes
substantial differences in timing, speed of diffusion, size, and distribu-
lion of wage increases within the industry, which should be granted.
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But this goes to the process of transmission only. It is not ground for
emphasizing either the isolation of this labor market or the noncom-
petitiveness of its labor force.
Third, I would like to see explored more fully the role of the product
market in wage determination. Banking and insurance services require
identical types of labor, but they involve distinct products. How did
occupational rates compare as between the two? Beyond both, there
are employers in other product markets who also use this kind of
labor. Table 7 indicates considerable variance in these occupational
rates as among different sectors in the winter of 1957-58. What is their
profile for the whole postwar period? What role did differences in
product markets play in effecting and possibly preserving differentials
for the same occupational groups?
Fourth, I think that more intensive examination is needed regarding
the structure of occupational rates within the firms in this industry. To
what extent was it given by effective competition, and to what extent
was it the product of administrative design? In the usual factory case,
as Dunlop pointed out some time ago, the market is too blunt an
instrument to provide the gradations in job rates that are normally
required. Arbitrary interpolations become necessary, either through
negotiation or evaluation, or some combination of the two. Is the mar-
ket for clerical labor in these fields effectively competitive enough to
provide each firm with a ready-made structure, or is there considerable
room for administrative discretion? If there is much discretion, are
there key rates and clusters to guide the administrators?
Last, one would like to know something about fringe benefits in this
market. Statistical difficulties in making comparisons are extremely
difficult in this field, but if benefits can be segregated as to kind, we
would have additional evidence regarding the impacts of unionism
upon nonunion labor markets.
Shultz has done some very useful pioneering in this study. Most of
my suggestions point to possibilities for further work. Such work is
essential to the attainment of his objective of increasing our knowledge
of actual labor markets in order to shore up the ground for public
policy. To me, his most important finding emerges in a somewhat
muted way: that here is a labor market in which competition works
with reasonable effectiveness, granting that its adequacy for promoting
the interests of workers as workers is a question as yet left unanswered.
In any case, there are other nonunion markets in which competition
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has not proved effective and probably never could be. If we are to
make further headway in gauging the impacts of unionism, we will
require more inquiries of this kind, to yield a fuller spectrum of types
of labor markets, and, with this, more knowledge of their operation
and their interrelations.
RIcJIABD A. LESTER,PrincetonUniversity
This paper involves the application to the white-collar field of the
techniques of studies in the manual-worker field of employment prac-
tices, and demand and supply factors. Since Shultz participated in the
Nashua study, more comparison of his results in this study with those
in other studies and an explanation of differences would have been
desirable.
Applied to employment in modern firms, incautious use of the term
"labor market" can create misunderstanding through misleading conno-
tations and the application of ill-suited concepts. In his paper 1 am not
certain whether "a nonunion market" was examined. At one point it is
referred to as a "submarket, a part of the general market for clerical
employees...." Butit "may not represent the supply side of the whole
market for clerical workers in Boston." Can and should one think of a
single market for all clerical workers in metropolitan Boston? Or should
one think in terms of submarkets by industry, by area, by occupation,
or by individual firms? And to what extent do the parties themselves
think and operate in market terms?
For reasons offered in the paper, market concepts may not need
great modification or qualification when applied to the hiring of clerical
workers by banking and insurance firms under the sort of circumstances
explained in some detail. First, much of the hiring occurs in the spring
through the high schools supplying newly trained entrants, under
conditions of fairly wide knowledge of wage data. The situation re-
sembles corporation recruiting of college seniors on the campus. Second,
most of those employed are interested in short-term work. Seniority
and promotion are not stressed; the labor turnover apparently is ex-
ceedingly high, although no figures are given. Third, there exist con-
siderable employer exchange of wage information, and perhaps em-
ployer understandings on wages. The report states that "all the firms
are now involved in efforts to develop a common pool of information
about the labor market," that the large firms "were points of refer-
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ence in wage surveys for all the firms studied," and that certain dis-
cussions among personnel people "no doubt served to moderate the
forces of competition." More detailed information on such employer
interrelationships would have been helpful.
With that much common knowledge spread by high school guidance
counsellors among prospective employees and with that much coopera-
lion among employers, it is not surprising to find that, among the six
(in some years less) banks and insurance companies for which data
were available for the years 1947 to 1955, the top firm's hiring rate
was not over 12 per cent above the bottom firm's hiring rate, and, on
the average, was under 10 per cent above.
Yet, despite all the pressures narrowing company wage differentials,
it is stated that the raising of the legal minimum to 75 cents and later
to $1.00 affected three companies as a sort of "mopping-up function"
and that compression of the wage structure from raising the hiring rate
was experienced in a number of the firms. Thus, "faithful employees
with limited mobility were apparently being neglected with a gen-
erally bad effect on morale." Why did their wages lag, and what forces
caused them later to rise relatively, if that did occur?
It would have been desirable to have plotted the changes in the
minimum hiring rate of each of the firms studied over the nine years
for which data were collected, 1947-56. In that way, it would have
been possible to observe changes in interfirm differentials and the tim-
ing of the wage rate changes for different firms. With that knowledge,
one could try to determine the factors that explained the results.
In this connection, perhaps the author's reference to Table 7 as
showing the narrowness of the band of rates for particular jobs is some-
what ambiguous. In that table, which reproduces average weekly
earnings from a BLS study of women in office jobs, considerable range
of variation is shown, especially when one takes account of the fact
that only the earnings averages for each of 6 industry groups (manu-
facturing, public utilities, wholesale trade, retail trade, finance, and
services) are being compared. Nevertheless, despite a range composed
of only 6 averages, the high average exceeds the low one by the
following percentages for each of the 9 occupations: 23 per cent, 20
per cent, 13 per cent, 17 per cent, 30 per cent, 22 per cent, 26 per cent,
and 13 per cent. Under the circumstances, those could be considered
significant wage differences.
The material in this paper indicates that industrial relations policies
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and governmental actions affect wage levels and structures. Part of the
task of the economist is to analyze the consequences of institutional
arrangements and not merely to reason as though the concepts of
purely competitive and monopolistic analysis apply without qualifica-
tion to employment in the workshop and the locality.
Shultz's results show that, despite differences, white-collar employ-
ment under nonunion conditions has some of the attributes and insti-
tutional influences that have been found in similar studies of manual
workers. It would have been helpful to have had even more data for
comparison and testing of such conclusions as the following from other
studies:
1. In practice it is rare indeed to find a single "going," "market," or
"competitive" wage. Only under conditions of complete unionization
or complete unity of employer action is such wage uniformity likely
to occur for the same quality of workers in a particular area. What
one usually finds is a band of rates, often distributed without any re-
semblance to a bell-shaped curve.
2. Job applications do not represent labor supply. Rather, they serve
a variety of purposes including a search for job information by workers,
a ritual to satisfy unemployment compensation requirements or to avoid
criticism at home, an act based on misinformation, a means of putting
pressure on one's present employer, a form of job shopping, etc. A
company tends to get the number of applications it seeks, and its vol-
ume of applications expands and contracts, not so much according to
its relative wage position as with the company's actual employment—
whether it is hiring people or laying them off.
3. A "rationing of jobs" occurs whenever companies are hiring.
Firms usually hire only a fraction of those who apply. Companies pay-
ing below the average hiring rate in their industry still have to select
or ration the available jobs among the applicants who meet the mini-
mum standards.
In view of some remarks in the Alchian-Kessel paper, it might also be
well to add that discrimination occurs against certain types of labor
(Negroes, Mexicans, Jews, or other minority groups, or against females
and older workers), not so much because employers gain nonpecuniary
satisfactions therefrom but because of custom, social prejudice, fear
of social disapproval, unfounded superstitions, etc.
Shultz neglected to investigate the hypothesis that pretty secretaries
are better paid because they contribute to the nonpecuniary satisfac-
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tions of their employers and that, therefore, the level of secretarial
pulchritude is considerably higher in public utilities (or possibly banks)
than in so-called competitive firms. That interesting speculation is not
confirmed by my limited experience of interviewing executives in their
offices over a couple of decades. My guess is that public utilities and
less competitive firms have just as high a proportion of "unlovelies" in
their offices as do other industries, partly for reasons which are ap-
parent to married executives and because of the image which such
firms seek to project to the public.
One can sit and spin hypotheses by the hour. Some of them will be
more sensible and some more nonsensical than others. Field studies,
such as this one by Shultz, have the advantage that they stimulate new
lines of thought and help to keep theoretical speculation from rambling
without relation to the facts of employment. Examination of such
studies and reflection on them can thus aid considerably in the efficient
use of the scarce resources devoted to research and writing in the
fields of wages and employment at the local level.
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